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Abstract—Machine learning has become mainstream across
industries. Numerous examples proved the validity of it for
security applications. In this work, we investigate how to reverse
engineer a neural network by using only power side-channel
information. To this end, we consider a multilayer perceptron
as the machine learning architecture of choice and assume a
non-invasive and eavesdropping attacker capable of measuring
only passive side-channel leakages like power consumption,
electromagnetic radiation, and reaction time.
We conduct all experiments on real data and common neural
net architectures in order to properly assess the applicability and
extendability of those attacks. Practical results are shown on an
ARM CORTEX-M3 microcontroller. Our experiments show that
the side-channel attacker is capable of obtaining the following
information: the activation functions used in the architecture,
the number of layers and neurons in the layers, the number
of output classes, and weights in the neural network. Thus, the
attacker can effectively reverse engineer the network using side-
channel information.
Next, we show that once the attacker has the knowledge about
the neural network architecture, he/she could also recover the
inputs to the network with only a single-shot measurement.
Finally, we discuss several mitigations one could use to thwart
such attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning, and more recently deep learning, has
become hard to ignore for research in distinct areas, such
as image recognition [1], robotics [2], natural language pro-
cessing [3], and also security [4], [5] mainly due to its
unquestionable practicality and effectiveness. Ever increasing
computational capabilities of the computers of today and
huge amounts of data available are resulting in much more
complex machine learning architectures than it was envisioned
before. As an example, AlexNet architecture consisting of
8 layers was the best performing algorithm in image clas-
sification ILSVRC2012 (http://www.image-net.org/challenges/
LSVRC/2012/) classification task. In 2015, the best perform-
ing architecture for the same task was ResNet consisting of
152 layers [6]. This trend is not expected to stagnate any time
soon, so it is prime time to consider machine learning from a
novel perspective and in new use cases.
In this work, we focus on the widely used machine learn-
ing family of algorithms: the neural networks family. With
the increasing number of design strategies and elements to
use, fine tuning of hyperparameters of these algorithms is
emerging as one of the main challenges. When considering
distinct industries, we are witnessing an increase in intellectual
property (IP) models strategies. Basically, for those cases
when optimized networks are of commercial interest their
details are kept undisclosed. For example, EMVCo (formed
by MasterCard and Visa to manage specifications for payment
systems and to facilitate worldwide interoperability) nowadays
requires deep learning techniques for security evaluations [7].
This has an obvious consequence in: on one hand security
labs generating (and using) neural networks for evaluation
of products and on the other hand they treat them as IP,
exclusively for their customers.
There are also other reasons for keeping the neural network
architectures secret. Often, these pre-trained models might
provide additional information regarding the training data,
which can be very sensitive. For example, if the model is
trained based on a medical record of a patient [8], confidential
information could be encoded into the network during the
training phase. Also, machine learning models that are used
for guiding medical treatments are often based on a patient’s
genotype making this extremely sensitive from the privacy
perspective [9]. Even if we disregard privacy issues, obtaining
useful information from neural network architectures can lead
to acquiring trade secrets from competition, which can lead
to competitive products without violating intellectual property
rights [10]. Hence, determining the layout of the network with
trained weights is a desirable target for the attacker. One could
ask the following question: why would an attacker want to
reverse engineer the neural network architecture instead of
just training the same network on its own? There are several
reasons that are complicating this approach. First, the attacker
might not have access to the same training set in order to
train his own neural network. Second, as the architectures
have become more complex, there are more parameters to tune
and it could be extremely difficult for the attacker to pinpoint
the same values for the parameters as in the architecture of
interest.
Our main question relates to the feasibility of reverse
engineering such architectures. Although binary analysis can
already give useful information about the network, in practical
cases, binary readback could be disabled by e.g., blocking
JTAG access [11]. However, exploiting side-channel leakages
remains a viable option. Side-channel analyses have been
widely studied in the community of information security and
cryptanalysis, due to its potentially devastating impact on
otherwise (theoretically) secure algorithms. Concretely, it has
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been observed that different physical leakages from devices
on which cryptography is implemented, such as timing delay,
power consumption, and electromagnetic emanation (EM) dur-
ing the computation of the data is dependent on the processed
internal state and thus data. By statistically combining this
physical leakage of the specific internal state and hypothesis
on the data being manipulated, it is possible to recover the
intermediate state being processed by the device.
In this study, our aim is to highlight the potential vul-
nerabilities of standard (perhaps still naive from the security
perspective) implementations of neural networks. At the same
time, we are unaware of any neural network implementation
in the public domain that includes side-channel protection.
For this reason, we do not just point to the problem but also
suggest some means of protection of neural networks against
side-channel attacks. Here, we consider some of the basic
building blocks of neural networks: the number of hidden
layers, the basic multiplication operation, and the activation
functions. Assuming that the multiplications are performed
on one known and one unknown operand and by observing
e.g., power consumption as the leakage, additional information
about the output of the multiplication becomes available. In
this case, different hypotheses of the possible values can be
correlated with the leakage to recover the unknown input up
to a certain precision. We show that for our target implemen-
tation, the value of an unknown input to the multiplication
could be estimated with up to 0.01 precision.
The complex structure of activation function often leads to
conditional branching due to the necessary exponentiation and
division operations. Thus, conditional branching introduces
input dependent timing differences resulting in different timing
behavior for different activation function, allowing function
identification. Basically, simply by observing the side-channel
signatures, it is possible to deduce number of nodes, and
also the number of layers in the networks. By using the
usual divide-and-conquer approach for side-channel analysis,
the information at each layer could be recovered, and the
recovered information can be used as input for recovering
the subsequent layers. Consequently, in this work, we show
it is possible to recover the layout of unknown networks by
exploiting the side-channel information.
To our best knowledge, this kind of observation has never
been used before in this context. At least not for leveraging
on (power/EM) side-channel leakages with reverse engineering
the neural networks architecture as the main goal. We position
our results in the following sections of this work.
The motivation for our work comes from ever more per-
vasive use of neural networks in security-critical applications
and the fact that the architectures are becoming proprietary
knowledge for the security evaluation industry. Thus, reverse
engineering a neural net has become a new target for the adver-
saries and we need a better understanding of the vulnerability
to side-channel leakages in those cases to be able to protect
the users’ rights and data.
A. Related Work
There are many papers considering machine learning and
more recently, deep learning for improving the effectiveness
of side-channel attacks. For instance, a number of works have
compared the effectiveness of classical profiled side-channel
attacks against various machine learning techniques [12], [13],
[14]. Lately, several works explored the power of deep learning
in the context of side-channel analysis [15]. However, that
line of work is putting a classifier from machine learning
in the context of side-channel distinguishers i.e. the selection
function leading typically to e.g., the key recovery.
On the other hand, using side-channel analysis in order
to attack machine learning architectures has been much less
investigated. Shokri et al. investigate the leakage of sensitive
information from machine learning models about individual
data records on which they were trained [16]. They show that
such models are vulnerable to membership inference attacks
and they also evaluate some mitigation strategies. Song et
al. show how a machine learning model from a malicious
machine learning provider can be used to obtain information
about the training set of a model [17]. Hua et al. were first to
reverse engineer two convolutional neural networks, namely
AlexNet and SqueezeNet through memory and timing side-
channel leaks [18]. The authors measure side-channel through
an artificially introduced hardware Trojan. They also need
access to original training data for part of the attack, which
might not always be available. Lastly, in order to obtain
the weight of the neural networks, they attack very specific
operation i.e., zero pruning [19], which to an extent is more
common for ReLU. Wei et al. have also performed an attack on
an FPGA-based convolutional neural network accelerator [20].
They recovered the input image from the collected power
consumption traces. The proposed attack exploits a specific
design choice i.e., the line buffer in a convolution layer of a
CNN. In a nutshell, both previous reverse engineering efforts
using side-channel information were performed on very special
design choices for neural networks and having specific goals
for the attacks.
Ohrimenko et al. used a secure implementation of MapRe-
duce jobs and analyzed intermediate traffic between reducers
and mappers [21]. They showed how an adversary observing
the runs of typical jobs can infer precise information about the
inputs. Xu et al. introduced controlled-channel attacks, which
is a type of side-channel attack allowing an untrusted operating
system to extract large amounts of sensitive information from
protected applications [22]. Ohrimenko et al. discussed how
machine learning algorithms data-oblivious algorithms can
be exploited by various side-channels [23]. Consequently,
they propose data-oblivious machine learning algorithms that
prevent exploitation of side channels induced by memory, disk,
and network accesses. Still, they note that side-channel attacks
based on power and timing analysis are outside of the scope
of their research.
Orthogonally to those works, we explore the problem of
reverse engineering of neural networks from a more generic
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perspective and in a grey to black-box setting. To be specific,
the closest previous works to ours have reverse engineered
neural networks by using cache attacks which work on distinct
CPUs and are basically micro-architectural attacks (although
using timing side-channel). Our approach utilizes power side-
channel on small embedded devices and it is supported by
practical results obtained on a real-world architecture.
B. Contribution and Organization
The main contributions of this paper are:
1) We describe a full reverse engineering of neural network
parameters based on side-channel analysis. A combi-
nation of side-channel leakages is used to recover key
parameters i.e., activation function, pre-trained weights,
number of hidden layers and neurons in each layer. The
proposed attack does not need any information on the
(sensitive) training data as that information is often not
even available to the attacker. We emphasize that, for our
attack to work, we require only the knowledge of some
inputs/outputs and side-channel measurements, which is
a standard assumption for side-channel attacks.
2) All the proposed attacks are practically implemented and
demonstrated on two distinct microcontrollers (i.e. 8-bit
AVR and 32-bit ARM), allowing full reverse engineering
of the network architecture.
3) Further, a single trace input recovery attack has been
proposed, which recovers a dataset when applied on the
initial layers. This implies that the attacker can recover all
the inputs tested with a known neural network, recovering
each input from a single measurement. Such attacks can
put user’s sensitive data at great risk.
4) We highlight some interesting aspects of side-channel
attacks when dealing with real numbers, unlike in ev-
eryday cryptography. For example, we show that even
a side-channel attack that failed can provide sensitive
information about the target due to precision error.
5) Finally, we propose a number of mitigation techniques
that will render side-channel attacks more difficult.
We emphasize again that the simplicity of our attack is
its strongest point, as it minimizes the assumption on an
adversary. This makes the underlying problem even more
serious as the attack does not require any pre-processing,
chosen-plaintext messages, etc.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we give details about specific machine learning algorithms we
consider and side-channel analysis techniques we use. Sec-
tion III gives results on reverse engineering of various elements
of neural networks and Section IV on input recovery attack.
Section V demonstrates the feasibility of attack on modern 32-
bit ARM microcontrollers. In Section VI, we briefly discuss
possible countermeasures one could apply to make our attacks
more difficult. Finally, in Section VII, we conclude the paper
and discuss potential future research directions.
Fig. 1: Depiction of an artificial neuron.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we give details about artificial neural net-
works and their building blocks. Next, we discuss the concepts
of side-channel analysis and several types of attacks we use
in this paper.
A. Artificial Neural Networks
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) is an umbrella notion
for all computer systems loosely inspired by biological neural
networks. Such systems are able to “learn” from examples,
which makes them a strong (and very popular) paradigm in the
machine learning domain. Any ANN is built from a number
of nodes called artificial neurons. The nodes are connected in
order to transmit a signal. Usually, in an ANN, the signal at the
connection between artificial neurons is a real number and the
output of each neuron is calculated as a nonlinear function of
the sum of its inputs. Neurons and connections have weights
that are adjusted as the learning progresses. Those weights
are used to increase or decrease the strength of a signal at
a connection. In the rest of this paper, we use the notions
of an artificial neural network, neural network, and network
interchangeably.
A very simple type of a neural network is called perceptron.
A perceptron is a linear binary classifier applied to the feature
vector. Each vector component has an associated weight wi
and each perceptron has a threshold value θ. The output
of a perceptron equals “1” if the direct sum between the
feature vector and the weight vector is larger than zero and
“-1” otherwise. A perceptron classifier works only for data
that are linearly separable, i.e., if there is some hyperplane
that separates all the positive points from all the negative
points [24]. We depict a model of an artificial neuron in
Figure 1. In the case of the perceptron, the activation function
is the step function.
By adding more layers to perceptron, we arrive to the
multilayer perceptron algorithm. Multilayer perceptron (MLP)
is a feed-forward neural network that maps sets of inputs onto
sets of appropriate outputs. It consists of multiple layers of
nodes in a directed graph, where each layer is fully connected
to the next one. Consequently, each node in one layer connects
with a certain weight w to every node in the following
layer. Multilayer perceptron algorithm consists of at least three
layers: one input layer, one output layer, and one hidden layer.
Those layers must consist of nonlinearly activating nodes [25].
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Fig. 2: Multilayer perceptron.
We depict a model of a multilayer perceptron in Figure 2.
Note, if there is more than one hidden layer, then it can be
considered a deep learning architecture. At the same time, if
the activation function for a neuron is the step function, it
is easy to show that any number of layers can be reduced
to two layers (one input and one output layer). Differing
from linear perceptron, MLP can distinguish data that are not
linearly separable. To train the network, the backpropagation
algorithm is used, which is a generalization of the least mean
squares algorithm in the linear perceptron. Backpropagation is
used by the gradient descent optimization algorithm to adjust
the weight of neurons by calculating the gradient of the loss
function [24].
An activation function of a node is a function f defining the
output of a node given an input or set of inputs, see Eq. (1).
In order for ANN to be able to calculate nontrivial functions
using a small number of nodes, we need to use nonlinear
activation functions.
y = Activation(
∑
(weight · input) + bias). (1)
In this paper, we consider the logistic (sigmoid) function,
tanh function, softmax function, and Rectified Linear Unit
function. The logistic function is a nonlinear function giving
smooth and continuously differentiable results [26]. The range
of a sigmoid function is [0, 1], which means that all the values
going to the next neuron will have the same sign.
f(x) =
1
1 + e−x
. (2)
The tanh function is a scaled version of logistic function
where the main difference is that it is symmetric over the
origin. The tanh function ranges in [−1, 1].
f(x) = tanh(x) =
2
1 + e−2x
− 1. (3)
The softmax function is a type of sigmoid function able to
map values into multiple outputs (e.g., classes). The softmax
function is ideally used in the output layer of the classifier
in order to obtain the probabilities defining a class for each
input [27].
f(x)j =
exj∑K
k=1 e
xk
, for j = 1, . . . K. (4)
The Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) is a nonlinear function
that is differing from the previous two activation functions as
it does not activate all the neurons at the same time [28].
By activating only a subset of neurons at any time, we
make the network sparse and easier to compute. Consequently,
such properties make ReLU probably the most widely used
activation function in ANNs today.
f(x) = max(0, x). (5)
B. Side-channel Analysis
Side-channel Analysis (SCA) exploits weaknesses on the
implementation level [29]. More specifically, all computations
running on a certain platform result in unintentional physical
leakages. Those leakages are a sort of physical signatures from
the reaction time, power consumption, and EM emanations
released while the device was manipulating data. SCA exploits
those physical signatures aiming at the key (secret data)
recovery. In its basic form, SCA was proposed to perform key
recovery attacks on implementation of cryptography [30], [31].
One advantage of SCA over traditional cryptanalysis is that
SCA can apply a divide-and-conquer approach. Thus, instead
of testing and recovering the full key at once, SCA can be used
to recover small parts of the key independently, exponentially
reducing the attack complexity.
However, the scope of SCA is much wider. For example,
SCA was recently used to demonstrate IP theft from 3D
printers [32]. Based on the analysis technique different variants
of SCA are known. In the following, we recall a few analysis
techniques used later in the paper. Although the following
terms suggest power analysis, these techniques apply to other
side-channels as well.
1) Simple Power Analysis (SPA): Simple power analysis,
as the name suggests, is the most basic form of SCA [31].
It targets information from a sensitive computation which can
be recovered from a single or a few traces.
As a common example, SPA can be used against a straight-
forward implementation of the RSA algorithm. Namely, the
RSA exponentiation is composed of a sequence of square and
multiply operations which depend on secret key bit (multiply
follows square only when the secret bit is 1, else only square
is executed). As square and multiply have distinct physical
signatures the adversary can directly read out the key bits from
e.g., a power trace on a digital oscilloscope. Similar attacks
have been applied to secret-key algorithm like AES [33] but
then targeting key schedule. In this work, we apply SPA to
reverse engineer the architecture of the neural network.
2) Differential Power Analysis (DPA): DPA is an advanced
form of SCA, which applies statistical techniques to recover
secret from physical signatures when SPA is not possible. The
attack normally tests for dependencies between actual physical
signature (or measurements) and hypothetical physical signa-
ture i.e., predictions on intermediate data. The hypothetical
signature is based on a leakage model and key hypothesis.
With the divide-and-conquer approach, parts of the secret
key (e.g., one byte) can be tested independently, allowing
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exhaustive search on key hypothesis. The knowledge of the
leakage model comes from the adversary’s intuition and exper-
tise. Some commonly used leakage models for representative
devices are the Hamming weight for microcontrollers and
the Hamming distance in FPGA, ASIC, and GPU [34], [35]
platforms.
As the measurements can be noisy, the adversary often
needs many measurements, sometimes millions. Next, statis-
tical tests like correlation [36] are applied to identify correct
key hypothesis from other wrong hypotheses. As we show
later in the paper, DPA is used to recover secret weights from
a pre-trained network.
3) Horizontal Power Analysis (HPA): HPA is another sort
of side-channel attack using power as the source of leak-
age [37]. While DPA recovers the secret key statistically over
multiple measurements, HPA is a single trace attack exploiting
several elementary operations in a single computation. The
idea behind it is that identical data being manipulated even
in different computation steps will have the same power
signatures and can be recovered by e.g., pattern recognition
techniques. HPA can be used against protected implementa-
tion, for example with exponent blinding, where an adversary
is limited to only one measurement. In this paper, we use HPA
to perform input recovery attack for a known network where
we prove the technique to be effective for medium to large
sized networks.
III. SIDE-CHANNEL BASED REVERSE ENGINEERING OF
NEURAL NETWORKS
As already discussed, side-channel leakages have been
frequently used for cryptanalysis, in particular for key recovery
attacks in cryptography and for the reverse engineering of
cryptographic algorithms. In this work, we demonstrate the
first application of SCA for reverse engineering of neural net-
works, with practical measurements on embedded platforms.
A. Threat Model
The two main goals of this paper are to recover the neural
network architecture and its inputs using only side-channel
information.
Scenario. We select to work with MLP since 1) it is a
commonly used machine learning algorithm in modern appli-
cations, see e.g., [38], [39], [40], [41]; 2) it consists of fully
connected layers which are also occurring in other architec-
tures like convolutional neural networks or recurrent neural
networks; and 3) the layers are all identical, which makes it
more difficult for SCA and could be consequently considered
as the worst-case scenario. We choose our attack to be as
generic as possible while discarding common assumptions,
which would make the attack easier but also more limited
in scope. For instance, we have no assumption on the type
of inputs or its source, as we work with real numbers. If the
inputs are in form of integers (like the MNIST database), the
attack becomes easier, since we would not need to recover
mantissa bytes and deal with precision. We also assume that
the implementation of the machine learning algorithm does
not include any side-channel countermeasures. Currently, to
the best of our knowledge, no public implementation of ANN
deploys side-channel countermeasures.
Attacker’s capability. We consider a passive attacker who
is only capable of acquiring measurements of the device while
operating “normally” and not interfering with its operations.
We consider two settings:
1) Attacker does not know the architecture of the used
network but can feed random (or known) inputs to the
architecture
An adequate use case would be when the attacker legally
acquires a copy of the network in a black box setting and
aims at recovering its internal details, for IP theft. The
attacker can query the device with random/chosen inputs
and perform side-channel measurements while processing
the data. The goal for this setting is to reverse engineer the
following information about neural network architecture:
number of layers, number of outputs, activation functions,
weights in the network.
2) Attacker knows the architecture but does not know the
inputs to it
A suitable use case is where a secret dataset is tested
with a public MLP network. The input can correspond
to sensitive data such as medical records of patients. The
goal for this setting is to obtain the inputs (the data to
be classified) to the network and we achieve this with a
single measurement only.
B. Experimental Setup
Here we describe the attack methodology, which is first
validated on Atmel ATmega328P. Later, we also demonstrate
the proposed methodology on ARM Cortex-M3. The side-
channel measurements are collected during the execution of
the classification and they are captured using the Lecroy
WaveRunner 610zi oscilloscope. The oscilloscope measure-
ments are synchronized with the operations by common hand
shaking signals like start and stop of computation. To further
improve the quality of measurements, we opened the chip
package mechanically (see Figure 3a). An RF-U 5-2 near-field
electromagnetic (EM) probe from Langer is used to collect the
measurements (see Figure 3b). Note that EM measurements
also allow to observe the timing of all the operations and thus
the setup allows for timing side-channels based analysis as
well. The setup is depicted in Figure 3c.
Our choice of the target platform is motivated by:
• Atmel ATmega328P: This processor allows for high qual-
ity measurements. We are able to achieve a high signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) measurements, allowing us to focus
on developing the methodology.
• ARM Cortex-M3: A modern 32-bit microcontroller ar-
chitecture with multiple stages of pipeline, on chip co-
processors, low SNR measurements, and wide applica-
tion. We show that the developed methodology is indeed
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(a) Target 8-bit microcontroller me-
chanically decapsulated
(b) Langer RF-U 5-2 Near-field
Electromagnetic passive Probe
(c) The complete measurement setup
Fig. 3: Experimental Setup
versatile across targets with a relevant update of measure-
ment capability.
For different platforms, the leakage model could change, but
this would not limit our approach and methodology. In fact,
those leakage models are well known for other common
platforms like FPGA [34] and GPU [35]. Moreover, as for
ARM Cortex-M3, low SNR of the measurement might force
the adversary to increase the number of measurements and
apply signal pre-processing techniques, but the principles of
the analysis remain valid.
As already stated above, the exploited leakage model of
the target device is the Hamming weight (HW) model. A
microcontroller loads sensitive data to a data bus to perform
indicated instructions. This data bus is pre-charged to all
’0’s’ before every instruction. Note that data bus being pre-
charged is a natural behavior of the microcontroller and not a
vulnerability introduced by the attacker. Thus, the new power
consumption (or EM radiation) is modeled as the number of
bits equal to ’1’ in the loaded data. In other words, the power
consumption of loading data x is:
HW (x) =
n∑
i=1
xi , (6)
where xi represents the ith bit of x. In our case, it is the secret
pre-trained weight which is regularly loaded from memory
for processing and results in the HW leakage. To conduct
8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11
time samples 105
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2 Multiplications Activation function
Fig. 4: Observing pattern and timing of multiplication and
activation function
the side-channel analysis, we perform the divide-and-conquer
approach, where we target each operation separately. The full
recovery process is described in Section III-F.
Several pre-trained networks are implemented on the board.
The training phase is conducted offline, and the trained net-
work is then implemented in C language and compiled on the
microcontroller. In our experiments, we consider multilayer
perceptron architectures consisting of a different number of
layers and nodes in those layers. Note that, with our approach,
there is no limit in the number of layers or nodes we can attack,
as the attack scales linearly with the size of the network.
The methodology is developed to demonstrate that the key
parameters of the network, namely the weights and activation
functions can be reverse engineered. Further experiments are
conducted on deep neural networks with three hidden layers.
We emphasize that the method we use can be applied to larger
networks as well.
C. Reverse Engineering the Activation Function
We remind the reader that nonlinear activation functions are
necessary in order to represent nonlinear functions with a small
number of nodes in a network. As such, they are elements used
in virtually any neural network architecture today [1], [6]. If
the attacker is able to deduce the information on the type
of used activation functions, he/she can use that knowledge
together with information about input values to deduce the
behavior of the whole network.
We analyze the side-channel leakage from different activa-
tion functions. We consider the most commonly used activa-
tion functions, namely ReLU, sigmoid, tanh, and softmax [26],
[28]. The timing behavior can be observed directly on the EM
trace. For instance, as shown later in Figure 9a, a multipli-
cation is followed by activation with individual signatures.
For a similar architecture, we test different variants with
each activation function. We collect EM traces and measure
the timing of the activation function computation from the
measurements. The measurements are taken when the network
is processing random inputs in the range, i.e., x ∈ {−2, 2}.
A total of 2 000 EM measurements are captured for each
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(b) Sigmoid
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(c) Tanh
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(d) Softmax
Fig. 5: Timing behavior for different activation functions
activation function. As shown in Figure 4, the timing behavior
of the four tested activation functions have distinct signatures
allowing easy characterization.
Different inputs result in different processing times. More-
over, the timing behavior for the same inputs largely varies
depending on the activation function. For example, we can
observe that ReLU will require the shortest amount of time,
due to its simplicity (see Figure 5a). On the other hand,
tanh and sigmoid might have similar timing delays, but
with different pattern considering the input (see Figure 5b
and Figure 5b), where tanh is more symmetrical in pattern
compared to sigmoid, for both positive and negative inputs.
We can observe that softmax function will require most of the
processing time, since it requires the exponentiation operation
which also depends on the number of neurons in the output
layer. As neural network algorithms are often optimized for
performance, the presence of such timing side-channels is
often ignored. A function such as tanh or sigmoid requires
computation of ex and division and it is known that such
functions are difficult to implement in constant time. In addi-
tion, constant time implementations might lead to a substantial
performance degradation. Other activation functions can be
characterized similarly. Finally, Table I presents the minimum,
maximum, and mean computation time for each activation
function over captured 2 000 measurements. While ReLU is
fastest, the timing difference of each function stands out
individually, thus allowing a straightforward recovery.
D. Reverse Engineering of the Multiplication Operation
A well-trained network can be of a significant value. What
distinguishes a good versus poorly trained network for a
given architecture are the weights. With fine-tuned weights,
we can improve the accuracy of the network, which has
TABLE I: Minimum, Maximum, and Mean computation time
(in ns) for different activation functions
Activation Function Minimum Maximum Mean
ReLU 5 879 6 069 5 975
Sigmoid 152 155 222 102 189 144
Tanh 51 909 210 663 184 864
Softmax 724 366 877 194 813 712
both commercial and academic interest. In the following, we
demonstrate a way to recover those weights by using SCA.
For the recovery of the weights, we use the Correlation
Power Analysis (CPA) i.e., a variant of DPA using the
Pearson’s correlation as a statistical test. CPA targets the
multiplication m = x · w of a known input x with a secret
weight w. Using the HW model, the adversary correlates the
activity of the predicted output m for all hypothesis of the
weight. Thus, the attack computes ρ(t, w), for all hypothesis
of the weight w, where ρ is the Pearson correlation coefficient
and t is the side-channel measurement. The correct value of
the weight w will result in a higher correlation standing in this
way out from all other wrong hypotheses w∗, given enough
measurements. Although the attack concept remains the same
as in the case of an attack on cryptographic ciphers, the
actual attack used here is quite different. While cryptographic
operations are always performed on fixed length integers, in
ANN we are dealing with real numbers.
We start by analyzing the way the compiler is handling
floating-point operations for our target. The generated assem-
bly is shown in Table II, which confirms the usage of IEEE
754 compatible representation as stated above. The knowledge
of the representation allows one to better estimate the leakage
behavior. Since the target device is an 8-bit microcontroller,
the representation follows 32-bit pattern (b31...b0), which is
stored in 4 registers. The 32-bit consist of: 1 sign bit (b31),
8 biased exponent bits (b30...b23) and 23 mantissa (fractional)
bits (b22...b0). It can be formulated as:
(−1)b31 × 2(b30...b23)2−127 × (1.b22...b0)2.
For example, the value 2.43 can be expressed as (−1)0 ×
2(1000000)2−127× (1.00110111000010100011111)2. The mea-
surement t is considered when the computed result m is
stored back to the memory, leaking in the HW model i.e.,
HW (m). Since 32-bit m is split into individual 8-bits, each
byte of m is recovered individually. Hence, by recovering this
representation, it is enough to recover the estimation of the
real number value.
To implement the attack two different approaches can be
considered. The first approach is to build the hypothesis on
the weight directly. For this experiment, we target the result
of the multiplication m of known input values x and unknown
weight w. For every input, we assume different possibilities
for weight values. We then perform the multiplication and
estimate the IEEE 754 binary representation of the output.
To deal with the growing number of possible candidates for
the unknown weight w, we assume that the weight will be
bounded in a range [−N,N ], where N is a parameter chosen
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(a) First byte mantissa for weight = 2.43 (b) Second byte mantissa for weight = 2.43 (c) Third byte mantissa for weight = 2.43
Fig. 6: Correlation of different weights candidate on multiplication operation
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Fig. 7: Correlation comparison between correct and incorrect
mantissa of the weights
by the adversary, and the size of possible candidates is denoted
as s = 2N/p, where p is the precision when dealing with
floating-point numbers.
Then, we perform the recovery of the 23-bit mantissa of the
weight. The sign and exponent could be recovered separately.
Thus, we are observing the leakage of 3 registers, and based on
TABLE II: Code snippet of the returned assembly for mul-
tiplication: x = x · w(= 2.36 or 0x3D0A1740 in IEEE 754
representation). The multiplication itself is not shown here, but
from the registers assignment, our leakage model assumption
holds.
# Instruction Comment
11a ldd r22, Y+1 0x01
11c ldd r23, Y+2 0x02
11e ldd r24, Y+3 0x03
120 ldd r25, Y+4 0x04
122 ldi r18, 0x3D 61
124 ldi r19, 0x0A 10
126 ldi r20, 0x17 23
128 ldi r21, 0x40 64
12a call 0xa0a multiplication
12e std Y+1, r22 0x01
130 std Y+2, r23 0x02
132 std Y+3, r24 0x03
134 std Y+4, r25 0x04
the best CPA results for each register, we can reconstruct the
mantissa. Note that the recovered mantissa does not directly
relate to the weight, but with the recovery of the sign and
exponent, we could obtain the unique weight value. The traces
are measured when the microcontroller performs secret weight
multiplication with uniformly random values between -1 and
1 (x ∈ {−1, 1}) to emulate normalized input values. We set
N = 5 and to reduce the number of possible candidates, we
assume that each floating-point value will have a precision of 2
decimal points, p = 0.01. Since we are dealing with mantissa
only, we can then only check the weight candidates in the
range [0, N ], thus reducing the number of possible candidates.
In Figure 6, we show the result of the correlation for each
byte with the measured traces. The horizontal axis shows time
of execution and vertical axis correlation. The experiments
were conducted on 1 000 traces for each case. In the figure,
the black plot denotes the correlation of the “correct” mantissa
weight (|m(wˆ) − m(w)| < 0.01), whereas the red plots are
from all other weight candidates in the range described earlier.
Since we are only attacking mantissa in this phase, several
weight candidates might have similar correlation peaks. After
the recovery of the mantissa, the sign bit and exponent can be
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recovered similarly, which narrows down the list candidate to
a unique weight. Another observation is that the correlation
value is not very high and scattered across different clock
cycles. This is due to the reason that the measurements
are noisy and since the operation is not constant-time, the
interesting time samples are distributed across multiple clock
cycles. Nevertheless, it is shown that the side-channel leakage
can be exploited to recover the weight up to certain precision.
Multivariate side channel analysis [42] can be considered if
distributed samples hinder recovery.
We emphasize that attacking real numbers as in the case of
weights of ANN can be simpler than attacking cryptographic
implementations. This is because cryptography works on fixed
length integers and exact values must be recovered. When
attacking real numbers, small precision errors due to rounding
off the intermediate values still result in useful information.
To deal with more precise values, we can target the man-
tissa multiplication operation directly. In this case, the search
space can either be [0, 223 − 1] to cover all possible values
for the mantissa (hence, more computational resources will
be required) or we can focus only on the most significant
bits of the mantissa (lesser candidates but also with lesser
precision). Since the 7 most significant bits of the mantissa
are processed in the same register, we can aim to target only
those bits, assigning the rest to 0. Thus, our search space is
now [0, 27−1]. The mantissa multiplication can be performed
as 1.mantissax × 1.mantissaw, then taking the 23 most
significant bits after the leading 1, and normalization (updating
the exponent if the result overflows) if necessary.
In Figure 7, we show the result of the correlation between
the HW of the first 7-bit mantissa of the weight with the
traces. Except for Figure 7b, the other results show that the
correct mantissa can be recovered. The most interesting result
is shown in Figure 7b, which at the first glance looks like a
failure of the attack. Here, the target value of the mantissa is
1100011110...10, while the attack recovers 1100100000..00.
Considering the sign and exponents, the attack recovers
0.890625 instead of 0.89, i.e., a precision error at 4th place
after decimal point. Thus, in both cases, we have shown that
we can recover the weights from the SCA leakage.
Lastly, in Figure 8, we show the composite recovery of 2
bytes of the weight representation i.e., a low precision setting
where we recover sign, exponent and most significant part of
mantissa. Again, the targeted (correct) weight can be easily
distinguished from the other candidates. Hence, once all the
necessary information has been recovered, the weight can be
reconstructed accordingly.
E. Reverse Engineering the Number of Neurons and Layers
After the recovery of the weights and the activation func-
tions, in this step, we use SCA to determine the structure of
the network. Mainly, we are interested to see if we can recover
the number of hidden layers and the number of neurons for
each layer. To perform the reverse engineering of the network
structure, we first use SPA. SPA is the simplest form of SCA
which allows information recovery in a single (or a few) traces
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(b) Second byte recovery (lsb exponent and mantissa)
Fig. 8: Recovery of the weight
with methods as simple as visual inspection. The analysis is
performed on three networks with different layouts.
The first analyzed network is an MLP with one hidden
layer with 6 neurons. The EM trace corresponding to the
processing of a randomly chosen input is shown in Figure 9a.
By looking at the EM trace, the number of neurons can be
easily counted. The observability arises from the fact that
multiplication operation and the activation function (in this
case, it is the Sigmoid function) have completely different
leakage signatures. Similarly, the structures of deeper networks
are also shown in Figure 9b and Figure 9c. The recovery
of output layer then provides information on the number
of output classes. However, distinguishing different layers
might be difficult, since the leakage pattern is only dependent
on multiplication and activation function, which are usually
present in most of the layers. We observe minor features
allowing identification of layer boundaries but only with low
confidence. Hence, we develop a different approach based on
CPA to identify layer boundaries.
The experiments follow similar methodology as in the
previous experiments. To determine if the targeted neuron is in
the same layer as previously attacked neurons, or in the next
layer, we perform a weight recovery using two sets of data.
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Fig. 9: SPA on hidden layers
Let us assume that we are targeting the first hidden layer
(the same approach can be done on different layers as well).
Assume that the input is a vector of length N0, so the input
x can be represented x = {x1, ..., xN0}. For the targeted
neuron yn in the hidden layer, perform the weight recovery on
2 different hypotheses. For the first hypothesis, assume that
the yn is in the first hidden layer. Perform weight recovery
individually using xi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N0. For the second
hypothesis, assume that yn is in the next hidden layer (the
second hidden layer). Perform weight recovery individually
using yi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ (n − i). For each hypothesis,
record the maximum (absolute) correlation value, and compare
both. Since the correlation depends on both inputs to the
multiplication operation, the incorrect hypothesis will result
in a lower correlation value. Thus, this can be used to identify
layer boundaries.
F. Recovery of the Full Network Layout
The combination of previously developed individual tech-
niques can thereafter result in a full reverse engineering of
the network. The full network recovery is performed layer by
layer, and for each layer, the weights for each neuron have
to be recovered one at a time. Let us consider a network
consisting of N layers, L0, L1, ..., LN−1, with L0 being the
input layer and LN−1 being the output layer. The reverse
engineering is performed with the following steps:
1) The first step is to recover the weight wL0 of each
connection from the input layer (L0) and the first hidden
layer (L1). Since the dimension of the input layer is
known, the CPA can be performed nL0 times (the size of
L0). The correlation is computed for 2d hypotheses (d is
the number of bits in IEEE 754 representation, normally
it is 32 bits, but to simplify, 16 bits can be used with
lesser precision for the mantissa). After the weights have
been recovered, the output of the sum of multiplication
can be calculated. This information provides us with the
input to the activation function
2) In order to determine the output of the sum of the
multiplications, the number of neurons in the layer must
be known. This can be recovered by the combination
of SPA and DPA technique described in the previous
subsection (2 times CPA for each weight candidate w,
so in total 2nL02
d CPA required), in parallel with the
weight recovery. When all the weights of the first hidden
layer are recovered, the following steps are executed.
3) Using the same set of traces, timing patterns for different
inputs to the activation function can be built, similar to
Figure 5. Timing patterns or average timing can then be
compared with the profile of each function to determine
the activation function (a comparison can be based on
simple statistical tools like correlation, distance metric,
etc). Afterward, the output of the activation function can
be computed, which provides the input to the next layer.
4) The same steps are repeated in the subsequent layers
(L1, ..., LN−1, so in total at most 2NnL2d, where nL
is max(nL0 , ..., nLN−1)) until the structure of the full
network is recovered.
The whole procedure is depicted in Figure 10. In general, it
can be seen that the attack scales linearly with the size of the
network. Moreover, the same set of traces can be reused for
various steps of the attack and attacking different layers, thus
reducing measurement effort.
IV. SINGLE TRACE INPUT RECOVERY ATTACK ON MLP
In the previous section, the methodology to reverse engineer
a neural network has been described and practically demon-
strated. In this section, we consider an alternate scenario,
where an unknown or secret input is fed to a known network.
By known network, we mean that the architecture and weights
are either public or known to the adversary (e.g., recovered by
reverse engineering). Generally, it can be extremely complex to
recover the input by observing outputs from a known network.
It involves several classifications in order to solve a system of
equations, while some of the functions might not be invertible,
i.e., ReLU. When considering theoretical attacks, the system of
equations can soon become unmanageable as the architecture
of the network becomes complex.
The proposed attack targets the multiplication operation in
the first hidden layer. It is exactly the opposite of the previous
weight recovery attack, as the weights w are known while
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Fig. 10: Methodology to reverse engineer the target neural network
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x*w1 
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One measurement with 4 multiplications 
aligned horizontally 
Split to 4  
multiplications 
Fig. 11: Illustration of a recovery of multiple measurements
from a single measurement processing several elementary
operations sequentially
input x is unknown. However, there is a strong limitation
with this attack. As x changes from one measurement to
another, information learned from one measurement cannot
be used with another measurement, preventing any statistical
analysis. In this case, the adversary is forced to exploit all the
measurements from a single measurement. Thus, to perform
information exploitation over a single measurement, we use
HPA. The weights in the first hidden layer are all multiplied
with the same input x, one after the other. Drawing analogy
with SCA on cryptography, several known plaintexts (weights
in case of MLP) are processed for a single unknown key (input
x here). The only difference is that all the processing is done
in different parts of a single trace. An input recovery attack
was proposed in [20], which requires multiple traces targeting
a line buffer, which is an optimization oriented design choice.
Contrary, our proposed attack targets the generic multiplication
in a single trace setting.
We measured the EM trace to perform an input recov-
ery attack. M multiplications, corresponding to M different
weights (or neurons), in the first hidden layer were isolated.
An illustrative example is shown in Figure 11 where M = 4
traces corresponding to 4 weights are recovered from a single
trace. Thus, a single trace is cut into M smaller traces, each
one corresponding to one multiplication with an associated
weight. Next, the value of the input is statistically inferred by
applying a standard DPA on the M smaller traces. The results
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Fig. 12: Input recovery attack on the initial layer
are shown in Figure 12 for different bytes of the same input.
The black curve shows the correlation of the correct input
while all wrong inputs are represented in red. The attack needs
20 or more multiplications to reliably recover the input. This
means that in the current setting, the proposed attack works
very well on medium to large sized networks, with at least 40
neurons in the first hidden layer (which is no issue in modern
architectures used today).
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(a) ReLU (b) Sigmoid
(c) Tanh
Fig. 13: Timing behavior for different activation functions
V. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION ON ARM CORTEX-M3
A methodology to reverse engineer sensitive parameters of
a neural network and input recovery was proposed in previous
sections. The attack was practically validated on an 8-bit
AVR (Atmel ATmega328P). In this section, we extend the
presented attack on a 32-bit ARM microcontrollers. ARM
microcontrollers form a fair share of the current market
with huge dominance in mobile applications, but also seeing
rapid adoption in markets like IoT, automotive, virtual and
augmented reality etc.
Our target platform is the widely available Arduino due
development board which contains an Atmel SAM3X8E ARM
Cortex-M3 CPU with a 3-stage pipeline, operating at 84 MHz.
The measurement setup is similar to previous experiments
(Lecroy WaveRunner 610zi oscilloscope and RF-U 5-2 near-
field EM probe from Langer). The point of measurements was
determined by a benchmarking code running AES encryption.
After capturing the measurements for the target neural net-
work, one can perform the reverse engineering.
The timing behavior of various activation functions are
shown in Figure 13. The results, though different from pre-
vious experiments on AVR, have unique timing signatures,
allowing identification of each activation function. The activity
of a single neuron is shown in Figure 14, which uses sigmoid
as an activation function (separated by multiplication a vertical
red line).
A known input attack is mounted on the multiplication
to recover the secret weight. One practical consideration in
attacking multiplication is that different compilers will compile
it differently for different targets. Modern microcontrollers
also have dedicated floating point units for handling operations
like multiplication of real numbers. To avoid the discrepancy
of a difference of multiplication operation, we target the output
Fig. 14: Observing pattern and timing of multiplication and
activation function
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Fig. 15: Correlation comparison between correct and incorrect
mantissa for weight=2.453
of multiplication. In other words, we target the point when
multiplication operation with secret weight is completed and
the resultant product is updated in general purpose registers
or memory. Figure 15 shows the success of attack recovering
secret weight of 2.453, with known input. As stated before,
side-channel measurements on modern 32-bit ARM Cortex-
M3 may have lower SNR thus making attack slightly harder.
Nevertheless, the attack is shown practical even on ARM
with 2× more measurements. In our setup, getting 200 extra
measurement takes less than a minute. Similarly, the setup and
number of measurements can be updated for other targets like
FPGA, GPU, etc.
Finally, the full network layout is recovered. The activity
of a full network with 3 hidden layers composed of 6, 5,
and 5 neurons each is shown in Figure 16. All the neurons
are observable by a visual inspection. The determination of
layer boundaries (shown by solid red line) can be determined
by attacking the multiplication operation and following the
approach discussed in Section III-F.
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Fig. 16: SPA on hidden layers with 3 hidden layers (6,5,5
neurons each)
VI. MITIGATIONS
As demonstrated above, various side-channel attacks can be
applied to reverse engineer certain components of a pre-trained
network. To mitigate such a recovery, several countermeasures
can be deployed:
1) Hidden layers of an MLP must be executed in sequence
but the multiplication operation in individual neurons
within a layer can be executed independently. An example
is shuffling [43] as a well-studied side-channel counter-
measure. It involves shuffling/permuting the order of exe-
cution of independent sub-operations. For example, given
N sub-operations (1, . . . , N ) and a random permutation
σ, the order of execution becomes (σ(1), . . . , σ(N))
instead. In this case, we propose to shuffle the order
of multiplications of individual neurons within a hidden
layer during every classification step. Shuffling modifies
the time window of operations from one execution to
another, mitigating a classical DPA attack.
2) Weight recovery, as well as the single trace input recov-
ery, can benefit from the application of masking counter-
measures [44], [42]. Masking is another widely studied
side-channel countermeasure that is even accompanied by
a formal proof of security. It involves mixing of sensitive
computations with random numbers to remove the depen-
dencies between actual data and side-channel signature,
thus preventing the attack. For every operation f(x,w), it
is transformed into fm(x⊕m1, w⊕m2) = f(x,w)⊕m,
where m,m1,m2 are uniformly drawn random mask, and
fm is the masked function which apply mask m at the
output of f , given masked inputs x⊕m1 and w⊕m2. If
each neuron is individually masked with an independently
drawn uniformly random mask for every iteration and
every neuron, the proposed attacks can be prevented.
However, this might result in a substantial performance
penalty.
3) The proposed attack on activation functions is possi-
ble due to the non-constant timing behavior. Mostly
considered activation functions perform exponentiation
operation. Implementation of constant time exponentia-
tion has been widely studied in the domain of public
key cryptography [45]. These well-studied ideas can be
adjusted to implement constant time activation function
processing.
Clearly, all those countermeasures come with an area and
performance cost. In particular, shuffling and masking require
a true random number generator that is typically very expen-
sive in terms of area and performance. Similarly, constant
time implementations of exponentiation [46] also come at
performance efficiency degradation. Thus, the optimal choice
of protection mechanism should be done after a systematic
resource and performance evaluation study.
VII. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Neural networks are widely used machine learning family
of algorithms due to its versatility across domains. Their
effectiveness depends on the chosen architecture and fine-
tuned parameters along with the trained weights, which can be
a proprietary information. In this work, we practically demon-
strate reverse engineering of a neural network using side-
channel analysis techniques. Practical attacks are performed
on measured data corresponding to chosen networks. To make
our setting more general, we do not assume any specific form
of the input data (except that inputs are real values).
We conclude that using an appropriate combination of SPA
and DPA techniques, all sensitive parameters of the network
can be recovered. Moreover, a powerful HPA method is used
to recover secret inputs from a known network in a single
shot side-channel analysis. The proposed methodology is
practically demonstrated on two different modern controllers,
a classic 8-bit AVR and a modern 32-bit ARM Cortex-M3
microcontroller. As shown, the attack on modern devices are
slightly harder to mount due to lower SNR for side-channel
attacks but are still practical. In the presented experiments, the
attack took 2× extra measurement, which require roughly 20
seconds extra measurement time. Overall, the attack method-
ology scales linearly with the size of the network.
Multilayer perceptron architectures are widely used but
arguably not the most common choice in state-of-the-art appli-
cations. Modern deep learning techniques like convolutional
neural networks or recurrent neural networks recently took
over and judging on the results they will remain as preferred
methods of choice in coming years. Yet, even those networks
use the same activation functions we consider here as well
as the fully connected layers (the difference is that they also
have other types of layers). Since we are able to differentiate
between the same type of layers in architectures, we expect
the difference to be even more profound when comparing with
other layer types.
When considering the weight vectors, here we consider the
case where each node has a separate weight. Convolutional
neural networks can actually also share those weights to lower
the degree of the problem. The same technique we use here
to obtain the independent weights can be used to obtain the
shared weights (with in the worst case scenario, multiple
unnecessary calculations for those shared weights).
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The proposed attacks are both generic in nature and more
powerful than the two previous works in this direction. Finally,
suggestions on countermeasures are provided to help designer
mitigate such threats. However, the proposed countermeasures
are borrowed mainly from side-channel literature and can
incur huge overheads. Nevertheless, we believe that they could
motivate further research on optimized and effective counter-
measures for neural networks. Besides continuing working on
countermeasures, as the main future research goal we envision
the need to explore other types of layers, like convolution
layers or max pooling layers.
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